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This essay investigates the determinants of the growth performance of Africa. I start by illustrating a 
broader research agenda which accounts not only for basic economic and demographic factors, but also 
for the role of history and institutional development. After reporting results from standard growth 
regressions, I analyze the role of Africa’s peculiar history, which has been marked by its colonization 
experience. Next I discuss the potential growth impact of state fragility, a concept which reflects 
multiple facets of the dysfunctions that plague the continent. The last topic I address is the influence, in 
and out of Africa, of the slave trades. The essay ends with critical conclusions and suggestions for 
further research.  
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1. Introduction  
 
One of the most challenging questions for modern growth theory is why Africa has been 
underperforming for the entire post-war period, and probably even before, if compared with the rest of 
the world. This fact remains true even though, following a long sequence of disastrous decades, the 
economic conditions of some African countries have shown a rapid improvement since the mid-1990s 
(Sala-i-Martin et al., 2010; Young, 2010).  
 
There is a growing literature which has tried to document and understand the African experience. An 
initial research line has attempted to compare Africa, as a whole, with the rest of the world. For a cross 
section of countries, Barro (1991) shows that a dummy for sub-Saharan Africa exerts a significant and 
negative effect on the average growth of per-capita GDP for the 1960-1985 period, after controlling for 
a broad set of growth correlates. In the same vein, some progress towards a deeper understanding of the 
area’s specific problems is made by Easterly and Levine (1997), who highlight the potential role of 
ethnic diversity, by Schmidt-Hebbel (1996), who focuses on fiscal policies, and by Sachs and Warner 
(1997), who emphasize the impact of geography.  
 
One limit of the continent dummy approach is that it can only assess how Africa as a whole, or its sub-
Saharan portion, differ from the rest of the world, thus obscuring important heterogeneities within the 
continent itself. Thus, a parallel line has attempted instead to emphasize specific cross-country 
differences within African samples. The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the main results so far 
reached within this stream of the literature. Rather than at a complete survey, my goal is to offer a 
reconstruction of the path followed by this largely empirical exploration and of its main turning points.  4
Moreover, I explain how research on the empirics of growth in Africa is inspired by a broader agenda 
which has focused on the links among growth, history, and institutions.   
 
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the general research agenda on growth, 
history, and institutions. Section 3 investigates the role of standard determinants of Africa’s specific 
growth performances. Section 4 focuses on those historical factors that are particularly important for 
Africa, being determined by the history of the continent’s colonization. Section 5 introduces the latest 
addition to the never ending list of candidate growth correlates, the concept of state fragility, and 
reviews its potential impact. Section 6 addresses the long term influence on development, in and out of 
Africa, of the slave trades. Section 7 derives critical conclusions and indicates directions for further 
research.  
 
2. Growth, history, and institutions 
 
The present investigation on the determinants of growth in Africa is an ideal application of a broader 
research agenda which has developed in recent years around the combination of  three main 
ingredients: the economics of growth, the theory of institutions, and their interrelationship with history.  
 
The revival of growth theory during the 1980s, building on Solow’s (1956) seminal contribution, is 
where this research line finds its deepest roots. Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) are the first to adapt the 
Solowian model by embedding endogenous technical progress and human capital, with the goal of  
comprehending the post-war persistence of cross-country differences in growth performances.   
  5
At the same time, the field of development economics, by then largely merged with macroeconomic 
dynamics, has come to recognize the crucial role of history in shaping a country’s destiny. Extended 
data collection, as a joint effort of economists, economic historians and historians (Maddison, 2007), 
has broadened the time horizon for empirical investigations over a longer and longer time span, thus 
allowing researchers to answer old questions and also to raise new ones. On the modeling front, an 
influential literature has investigated the determinants of growth over the long run, in order to find a 
unified explanation of very different phases of the history of human development, going back to the 
Malthusian era and even beyond (Galor, 2011).  
 
At the same time, extending the relevant time horizon backward has allowed economists to recognize 
an increasing role for institutional factors, besides purely economic ones. Indeed the historical and 
institutional dimensions complement each other, since the economic impact of institutions tends to 
manifest itself more clearly in the long run. Building on the earlier intuition by North (1981), a broad 
set of institutions has entered the research agenda.  Just to name a few contributors, Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) highlight the links among factor endowments, institutions, and differential growth 
paths.  La Porta et al. (1998) start a research line on the effects of legal institutions on various 
outcomes. Barro (1999) extends the growth regressions approach to the study of the links between 
growth and democracy. Acemoglu et al. (2004) point to institutions as the fundamental cause of long 
run growth.  
 
As explained in Bertocchi (2006), the case of Africa is especially promising as an application of the 
research line that combines growth, history and institutions, since the colonial institutions established 
in Africa mainly during the nineteenth century are likely to have shaped, directly and indirectly, the 
development of the area. Fenske (2011) provides a review essay on the role of institutions in African  6
history and development and argues that even crucial growth factors such as geography, ethnic 
fractionalization and colonial history operate largely through institutions. Nunn (2009) also provides a 
survey of the line of research on history and development, with a special focus on colonial rule as a 
unifying theme. 
 
3. Growth in Africa 
 
As previously explained, my main focus is on the differential growth performances within Africa. 
Among growth determinants, I start by discussing standard economic factors. Rodrik (1999) is among 
the first to adopt the growth regressions approach for a sample of African countries. With the goal of 
understanding the specific impact of trade policy, he replicates the specification chosen by Sachs and 
Warner (1997) for a sample of sub-Sahara African countries over the 1965-90 period. The dependent 
variable is per capita growth and the explanatory variables preliminarly considered are initial per capita 
income, dummies for tropical climate and landlocked countries, life expectancy, public savings, 
institutional quality, measures of openness, and population growth. A more parsimonious specification 
that accounts for limited data availability shows a significant effect of initial per capita income, life 
expectancy, public savings, population growth, and export taxation. Thus, he establishes that even 
within sub-Saharan Africa there is evidence of convergence, while growth differentials are explained 
by a combination of human resources and macroeconomic policy. These findings are broadly in line 
with standard predictions from growth theory, suggesting that the sources of underdevelopment in sub-
Saharan Africa are not specific to this region. However, the same exercise repeated over three sub-
periods (1964-74, 1975-84, and 1985-94) reveals a much worse fit of each regression and a loss of 
significance of trade policy and demographics. This suggests that over shorter horizons growth rates  7
tend to be unstable and that their determinants may vary over time, more widely in Africa if compared 
with the rest of the world. 
 
Another attempt to measure growth within Africa is presented by Bertocchi and Canova (2002), who 
adapt the benchmark growth regressions initially proposed by Barro (1991). Over the 1960-88 period, 
they select a specification including the combination of economic and sociopolitical variables which 
displays the best explanatory power for average growth of per capita income for a cross section of 
African countries. Such a combination includes the initial condition (and its square), the investment-
output ratio, the percentage of working age population in secondary school, the index of political rights, 
the index of ethnic fractionalization, and a dummy for oil producing countries. As in Rodrik (1999), in 
the full sample these variables tend to be associated with significant coefficients with the expected sign. 
However, over sub-periods, once again the picture varies considerably: in the 1960-1973 sample only 
investment matters, while only the index of ethnic fractionalization is significant in the 1974-1980 
sample, and very little significance is left in the final 1981-1988 sample. This non-robustness denies 
the existence of a single cause for Africa’s poor growth performance over the period under 
consideration and suggests that different factors may matter for subsequent stages of development. In 
the initial stage investment in physical capital appears to be the most important driver, while later on 
human capital accumulation and political rights emerge as crucial for growth. Bertocchi and Guerzoni 
(2011) produce updated evidence on the growth performance of the area by running comparable growth 
regressions over a yearly 1999-2004 panel. They find a tendency to convergence and that economic 
development is facilitated by schooling and government expenditures, while it is retarded by inflation 
and ethnic fractionalization. Over this time frame, the relationship between civil liberties and growth is 
non-linear, suggesting higher growth for intermediate regimes, even though with marginal statistical 
significance.   8
 
In all the investigations reported above, geographical variables such as latitude and a dummy for 
landlocked countries, which usually matter in a world context, turn out not to contribute to the 
understanding of the local growth experience, possibly because they exhibit limited regional variation.    
 
To conclude, while the analysis of standard growth factors does confirm, for Africa, conditional 
convergence, at the same time the influence of regressors other than the initial condition tends to vary 
significantly across samples, leading to unsatisfactory results that suggest a potential role for omitted 
variables.  
 
4. History and colonization 
 
The conclusion from the previous section is that standard growth determinants, even those reflecting 
current institutional characteristics, cannot provide a complete and robust description of the African 
case.  One of the most promising avenues undertaken by subsequent research has been to gauge the 
potential impact of the history of the continent, with special emphasis on its colonization experience. 
The basic conjecture behind this avenue is that colonization may be the reason both for low average 
growth rates in Africa and, at the same time, for the observed heterogeneities across African countries. 
Africa represents a particularly appropriate setting to analyze the impact of colonial rule on growth 
because, historically, nowhere else was colonization so far-reaching and time-homogeneous in nature 
as in the African experience that began at the end of the nineteenth century, despite significant 
differences across individual countries and colonization regimes. The prevailing wisdom from the 
previous, huge literature outside of economics was that colonization was bad for colonial economies. 
According to the drain of wealth thesis, most of the colonial surplus was extracted by the metropolitan  9
countries. Exploitation also distorted the colonial economies in many ways, by reducing physical and 
human capital accumulation and by generating dysfunctional institutions.  An alternative point of view 
emphasizes instead the positive modernization impulses that came from the metropolises and the 
advantages deriving from the integration of the colonies into the world economic system. Within the 
economic literature, Lucas (1990) and Grossman and Iyigun (1995) develop static models of colonial 
domination, while early empirical contributions are represented by La Porta et al. (1998), who focus on 
the legal origins associated with colonial heritage; Alam (1994), who compares the growth rates of 
sovereign countries and colonies, but with the exclusion of Africa; and Grier (1999), who studies the 
relationship between the length of colonial rule and growth.  
 
For the 1960-88 period, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) explore the empirical relevance of colonial 
variables for a sample of African countries within a standard growth regressions framework. To 
overcome the obstacle of data availability for the colonial period proper, they employ post-war data and 
historical information to identify the consequences of colonial domination for current performances. To 
this end, they classify African countries according to a number of indicators: their political status (i.e., 
colony vs. dependency vs. independent country) during the colonial period; their metropolitan ruler 
during domination; and the degree of economic penetration they were exposed to, as captured by the 
ratio of  GNP to GDP at the end of the colonial period. Controlling for standard determinants, they find 
that in Africa the identity of the metropolitan ruler and economic penetration do add explanatory power 
in cross-sectional growth regressions. Namely, British colonies have superior growth performances if 
compared with the former colonies of France, Italy, and Portugal, while higher economic penetration is 
detrimental. Moreover, the colonial indicators are correlated with measures of human capital 
accumulations and political distortions. Hence, several decades after the end of colonization, its legacy 
still exerts a significant impact on growth in Africa, both directly and indirectly.  These results support  10
the conjecture that colonial rule may indeed represent the omitted factor behind the relationship 
between local average growth rates and economic and sociopolitical factors. While the above 
conclusions are based on cross-country data for the 1960-88 period, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011) 
review the evidence over a yearly 1999-2004 panel, to find that colonial indicators no longer contain 
any explanatory power, which suggests that the lasting influence of the colonial era may finally have 
faded in more recent times.  
 
An influential related research line that has also developed around the issue of colonization is based on 
the original contribution by Acemoglu et al. (2001). With the more general goal of establishing the 
importance of institutions for current development, they identify in colonial history an instrument for 
institutions which can address their potential endogeneity. Indeed reverse causation becomes a crucial 
issue when taking into account institutional variables, since the direction of causality with respect to 
income and growth is by no means obvious. They focus on a specific variable, the mortality rate of the 
initial settlers, about which they collect and compile information based on detailed historic sources. 
Settler mortality is exploited as an instrument for current institutions, by arguing that colonizers 
adopted very different policies in places with different mortality rates. In places where they faced high 
mortality, they could not settle and were therefore more likely to set up extractive institutions, which in 
turn persist in present times. Their two-stage least-squares estimates establish that institutions, and in 
particular the degree of property rights protection, do affect economic development. In the previously 
mentioned papers based on growth regressions, the potential for endogeneity is addressed indirectly by 
Bertocchi and Canova (2002), who employ predetermined explanatory variables dated at the beginning 
of the sample period, and directly by Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011), who instrument with its lag the 
only variable for which they find evidence of endogeneity, i.e., government expenditure over GDP. For 
the sake of comparison between the two parallel streams of the literature on colonization, it should be  11
also noticed that Acemoglu et al. (2001), because of the way their instrumental variable is generated, 
can only include former colonies in their sample. Moreover, they do not focus exclusively on Africa. 
Finally, they do not distinguish, as Bertocchi and Canova (2002) do, between colonies and 
dependencies, even though to some extent it could be argued that at least within Africa dependencies 
were established in lower mortality places.   
 
Another related stream of the literature has gone even beyond the colonial period to discover the roots 
of current performances. Indeed one cannot exclude a role for long term factors that predate colonial 
domination. Examples are the following. Herbst (2000) points to the underdevelopment of pre-colonial 
polities. Bockstette et al. (2002) establish a link between state antiquity, a measure of the depth of 
experience with state level institutions, and institutional quality. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) uncover 
for Africa a positive association between stronger pre-colonial political institutions and public goods 
provision. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) show that tribal pre-colonial political institutions 
and class stratification still exert an effect on local economic activity in Africa, which they measure 
using satellite data on light density at night following Henderson et al. (2010). Finally, Nunn (2008a) 
studies the impact of the slave trades, while Nunn and Puga (2010) focus on  the historic interaction 
between terrain ruggedness and Africa’s slave trades, i.e., between geography and institutions. In 
Section 6 I return to the issue of the slave trades in more detail. 
 
More recently, micro-level data have also been exploited, with an even more precise focus on single 
African countries or specific sub-regions. One example of this line of research is Huillery (2009), who 
employs household surveys data on French West Africa to produce evidence that early colonial 
investments had large and persistent effects on current outcomes. 
  12
While the literature described so far is empirical, a few efforts have been made to model the underlying 
causal relationships within a dynamic setting. Bertocchi (1994) explicitly introduces colonization into a 
standard growth model with overlapping generations, in order to determine the net effect of 
modernization and the drain of wealth on the colonial economy. Colonization is modeled in the form of 
restrictions on direct foreign investment and exploitative activities, which may induce permanent 
distortions to physical and human capital accumulation and thus lead to negative growth rates even 
after decolonization. Nunn (2007) develops a game-theoretic model with multiple equilibria, only one 
of which is associated with secure property rights and a high level of production.  In this setting, 
external extraction may drive a society into a low production equilibrium. Since this equilibrium is 
stable, the society remains trapped into it even after external extraction ends. Both models thus provide 
an  explanation for the lasting legacy of colonial rule.  
 
Summing up, colonial history has been shown to matter for growth in Africa, in a number of 
dimensions, but its influence has not been captured by a single explanatory variable which can identify 
the impact of colonization. Moreover, its effect appears to have faded over time, while the region is still 
underperforming. This implies that even accounting for colonial history does not yet provide a 
complete and consistent answer to the question about the determinants of African growth. 
 
5. State fragility  
 
The concept of state fragility (from now on, fragility) is perhaps the most recent newcomer to the 
debate about growth in Africa.  Rather than to specific economic, institutional, or historical 
characteristics, the condition of fragility has been associated with combinations of multiple 
dysfunctions, including a country's inability to provide vital services, unstable and weak governance,  13
persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high propensity to conflict and civil war. 
It is clear, however, that these dysfunctions can in turn be determined by repeated interactions across a 
number of factors over the long run. While it may be difficult to isolate the influence of each of these 
factors singularly, using a composite measure may facilitate the analysis. 
 
Once again, Africa has played a central role in the analysis of fragility, since it is in this continent that 
fragility is especially widespread. Indeed the European Report on Development (2009) is entirely 
devoted to the problem of fragility in Africa.  The potential growth impact of fragility and the 
consequent relevance of fragility for policy are also confirmed by the increasing attention of other 
international organizations. The 2011 World Development Report (World Bank, 2011) focuses on 
conflict countries. Development practitioners, such as the Government and Social Development 
Resource Centre (2010), also warn policymakers about the need to understand and respond to fragile 
situations.  
 
One of the most widely used definitions of fragility is based on the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) which has been conducted by the World Bank since 1999. The ratings are intended 
to capture the quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the key 
elements that are within the country’s control, rather than on outcomes (such as growth rates) that are 
also influenced by elements outside the country’s control. Since the CPIA ratings represent criteria for 
aid allocation, they carry huge practical implications for policy. On the basis of the CPIA, the World 
Bank defines as fragile those low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below (over a 1-6 range). From 
1999 to 2005, the individual ratings have been kept confidential. However, the general rankings of 
countries have been made public. On the basis of the rankings, it is therefore possible to infer the 
distribution of the countries by quintile.  On the basis of the resulting quintile distribution, the OECD  14
defines as fragile those countries in the bottom two quintiles, as well as those which are not rated. 
There is a partial overlap between the CPIA-based definitions of fragility and other related indexes, 
such as the Failed State Index (published by the Fund for Peace), the Index of State Weakness 
(published by the Brookings Institution), the indicator of Failed & Fragile States (published by the 
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project), and the Fragility States Index (published by Polity IV). 
While all these indicators record similar components, the choice of variables and their weighting 
schemes remain largely arbitrary. 
 
There is a small but expanding literature on the link between fragility and development in Africa. 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011) employ the OECD definition of fragility within a yearly panel dataset 
covering sub-Saharan Africa in the 1999-2004 period. Following the benchmark specification of  Barro 
(1991) and Bertocchi and Canova (2002), they include in their growth regressions an initial condition 
for per capita income and a wide range of economic, demographic, geographic, and institutional 
factors. Their results indicate that the conventional measure of fragility employed by the OECD exerts 
no effect on economic development, once standard regressors are accounted for.  However, when they 
apply a more severe definition of fragility, which only includes the countries in the bottom quintile, 
they find a clear, negative impact of this condition, even after controlling for endogeneity through 
instrumental variables estimation. Using a comparable sample and the OECD conventional definition, 
Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) highlights how fragility exerts a non-linear impact on per capita income and 
that it tends to interact with several other factors: in fragile countries, beyond a threshold level trade 
openness may actually be harmful to income, while small improvements in political institutions can 
have adverse effects. Fosu (2009) explores the growth impact of policy syndromes, which include 
among other components state breakdown, a concept which is in turn close to fragility since it refers to 
a condition involving civil wars and acute political instability (see Fosu and O’Connell, 2006, for a  15
definition of policy syndromes). His findings are that the absence of policy syndromes encourages 
growth in Africa.  
 
The potential endogeneity of fragility is a serious concern, which has been addressed by Bertocchi and 
Guerzoni (2010) by gauging the links between fragility and other standard growth determinants. They 
find that indeed, within Africa, fragility tends to be shaped by institutional development, a conclusion 
which questions its exogeneity. In particular, the probability of a country having a fragile state appears 
to decrease with the level of civil liberties and to increase with the number of revolutions, while 
economic factors do not matter. These findings differ sharply from those presented by Carment et al. 
(2008) for a world sample, over which per capita income appears to be the main driver of fragility. This 
radically different conclusion can be explained, once again, by the specificity of the African region, but 
also by the fact that the former study employs the OECD definition of fragility, while the latter 
employs the index of Failed & Fragile States.  
 
Beside these empirical investigations, Besley and Persson (2011) propose a theoretical framework to 
understand how fragility can hamper development and growth. Their theory highlights how a state may 
become fragile in situations of external or internal conflict, high political instability, and heavy 
economic distortions, and how fragility may in turn lead to poverty traps. 
 
While the above contributions focus on the direct link between fragility and development, others have 
looked at its indirect influence through aid allocation. Since the condition of fragility is a crucial 
determinant of the amount of aid a country receives from international organizations, growth can be 
affected by fragility also through this channel.  The interaction between aid and fragility is addressed in 
a number of studies, none of which is specifically focused on Africa. However, given the preponderant  16
role played by African countries among fragile ones, their results are still useful to the present 
perspective. Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide evidence that aid is most effective in developing 
countries with sound institutions and policies. However, this conclusion is questioned on several 
grounds by Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard et al. (2004), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008).   
McGillivray and Feeny (2008) study the growth impact of aid in a world sample of fragile countries 
and find that it depends on the relative degree of fragility. Chauvet e Collier (2008) analyze the 
preconditions for sustained policy turnarounds in failing states and show that aid matters, but its effect 
depends on its kind (e.g., financial aid vs. technical assistance).  
 
As emphasized by the theory proposed by Besley and Persson (2011), fragility is closely associated 
with conflict. Therefore, the literature that has evaluated the growth impact of conflict is also relevant. 
Examples within this stream include Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002), who search for the economic 
causes of conflict and then establish that Africa is indeed more vulnerable to it, because of its poverty; 
Blanton et al. (2001), who focus on the relationship between colonial domination and post-colonial 
ethnic conflict in Africa; and Bleaney and Dimico (2011), who distinguish between the correlates of the 
probability of onset of civil war and the probability of its continuation.  
 
To conclude, the introduction of the broad concept of fragility, which reflects a complex combination 
of the dysfunctions that are typical of several African countries, has stimulated renewed interest for 
research on the deep roots of development in the region. At the same time, however, a clear impact of 
fragility on economic outcomes has proved hard to assess, partly because of the different definitions 





Another recent research line that has extended the perspective in a promising direction has focused on 
the long term impact of the African slave trades not only for Africa, but also for the recipient countries. 
This line of research is closely related to the previous ones since it emphasizes the role of historical 
factors and evaluates how their influence on economic outcomes may run through institutions. Nunn 
(2008a) first looks at the long term effects of Africa’s slave trades on Africa itself. On the basis of 
shipping records and historical documents, he constructs measures of the number of slaves exported 
from each country in Africa in each century between 1400 and 1900 and finds a robust negative 
relationship between the number of slaves exported and current economic performance. Thus, the 
African countries that are the poorest today are the ones from which the most slaves were taken, even 
after accounting for the possibility of selection into the slave trades. Moreover, the paper indicates that 
the procurement of slaves results in subsequent state fragility and ethnic fractionalization.  
 
 
The spillover of Africa’s slave trades on the economic performances of the receiving countries is the 
theme developed by Engerman and Sokoloff  (1997, 2002), on the basis of historical evidence they 
provide for the New World. Their influencial hypothesis can be summarized as follows.  They first 
argue that factor endowments (climate, soil, crops, etc.) determined the suitability and hence the 
adoption of plantation slavery. In turn the use of slave labor caused extreme economic inequality which 
shaped the evolution of local institutions (including voting rights, the taxation system, and educational 
policy) in a way that hampered long term economic development. With the goal of testing Engerman 
and Sokoloff’s hypothesis, Nunn (2008b) examines the relationship among slavery, inequality and 
economic development for a sample of 29 American countries and finds that the fraction of slaves over 
population in 1750 is indeed negatively correlated with per capita income in 2000. A similar negative  18
relationship emerges for slave use, in each decade between 1790 and 1860, across states and counties 
within the U.S., although no evidence is found that this relationship is driven by large scale plantation 
slavery, i.e., by factor endowments. For the U.S. case, Nunn (2008b) also tests whether inequality is the 
channel through which slavery manifests itself on underdevelopment. The findings are once again 
mixed since, while it is true that slavery in 1860 is positively associated with contemporaneous land 
inequality, land inequality in 1860 is not correlated with income in 2000. Overall, these results confirm 
that slavery was detrimental for economic development, even though they question both the link 
between slavery and factor endowments and the role of inequality as the channel of transmission 
between slavery and current development. A closer look at the U.S. is taken by Bertocchi and Dimico 
(2010), who find that the negative influence of the slave share on current income is actually not robust 
to the inclusion of geographic controls which capture structural differences among regions, and even 
turns positive when state fixed effects are included. On the other hand, they find a negative impact of a 
dummy for slave states which, rather than the intensity of slave use, should rather reflect institutional 
differences, possibly linked to the Black Codes and the Jim Crow Laws. Moreover, they find that 
slavery has a positive and robust effect on current income inequality, i.e., those U.S. counties that 
displayed a higher share of slaves over population are not necessarily poorer, but more unequal, in the 
present day. They also show that the impact of slave use on current income inequality runs through 
racial inequality and that the channel of transmission from slavery to inequality is human capital 
accumulation. In other words, current inequality is primarily influenced by slavery through the unequal 
educational attainment of blacks and whites. Finally, for a sample of Mississippi counties, Bertocchi 
and Dimico (2011) analyze the link between slavery and political institutions and show that the former, 
rather than de jure provisions such as poll taxes and literacy tests, is the main driver of blacks’ 
restricted suffrage at the end of the nineteenth century. Consistently, race and the legacy of slavery,  19
rather than suffrage, emerge as the main determinants of a broad set of indicators capturing multiple 
aspects of current development.  
 
A provisional conclusion I can draw from the above findings is that, despite the fact that the Engerman 
and Sokoloff’s hypothesis is only partially supported, across different samples and specifications, still 
there is evidence that Africa’s slave trades had a long lasting influence not only on Africa but also on 




The scope of this essay was to reconstruct the main steps along the path leading to the discovery of the 
determinants of growth in Africa, taking into account subsequent waves of a large literature which 
initiated from standard Solowian factors and ended up enclosing a wide array of additional 
considerations. While this literature had a broader scope, to account for the case of Africa was one of 
its main challenges.  With the words of Easterly (2002), I can conclude that, in and out of Africa, the 
quest for growth has indeed been quite an elusive one. The list of proposed determinants of growth, or 
lack of it, has included, in order of appearance, physical capital, demographics, human capital, 
macroeconomic policies, geography, ethnic division, disease, and a large variety of historical and 
institutional factors. Fragility, a complex mix of dysfunctions, has been the latest newcomer to this list. 
Accounting for Africa’s slave trades has allowed to broaden the perspective to growth spillovers even 
outside Africa itself.  While some progress has been achieved, many questions are still open. While the 
list of potential growth correlates may not be exhausted yet, at least part of the responsibility for the 
absence of definite answers may actually fall not on lack of imagination about additional hypotheses, 
but on the underlying growth regressions approach. The latter certainly has its limits even after the  20
advancements obtained through more sophisticated techniques including instrumental variables and 
panel estimation. Still, as acknowledged in a critical essay by Wacziarg (2002), despite their trouble in 
identifying causal links and the lack of robustness of their results, growth regressions have represented 
a first step toward a deeper understanding of what may underlie simple empirical correlations based on 
reduced forms. Durlauf et al. (2005) also recognize that most of the growth literature has simply 
attempted to investigate whether or not particular hypotheses can find any support in the data and to 
highlight systematic patterns. This approach, however, fails to capture the underlying channels of 
transmission. In order to establish causation, the estimated parameters must correspond to precisely 
identified links within a coherent framework derived from economic theory. Consider, for instance, the 
relationship between slavery and development. Even if it exhibited a robust statistical correlation, 
which is actually not the case, in order to understand its economic significance we would need a theory 
justifying the underlying mechanisms at work. In other words, why should past slavery still matter 
today? Because it reflects geography and initial factor endowments, because it shaped human capital 
accumulation in an unequal fashion, or else because it promoted divisive political institutions?  To 
conclude, structural models based on rigorous theoretical predictions are the next - harder - step for 
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